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The behavior of the least-secure user can influence security
and privacy outcomes for everyone else. Thus, it is important
to understand the factors that influence the security and privacy
of a broad variety of people. Prior work has suggested that
users with differing socioeconomic status (SES) may behave
differently; however, no research has examined how SES,
advice sources, and resources relate to the security and privacy
incidents users report. To address this question, we analyze
a 3,000 respondent, census-representative telephone survey.
We find that, contrary to prior assumptions, people with lower
educational attainment report equal or fewer incidents as more
educated people, and that users’ experiences are significantly
correlated with their advice sources, regardless of SES or
resources.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Security and privacy are intrinsically collective behaviors—
one person who clicks on a malicious email may spread that
email to their entire network. As such, it is important to
understand how differing knowledge, habits, and priorities can
shape security behavior and associated experiences across a
broad range of people.
Previous research has established the existence of a digital
divide: an access, skill, and knowledge gap in digital literacy
between lower- and higher-socioeconomic status (SES) popu-
lations [11, 12, 14, 28, 32, 33]. However, the bulk of research
on this topic has not directly addressed security and privacy.
Some researchers have theorized that low-income users “do
not value their data as highly,” that low-SES users may experi-
ence discrimination as a result of differing privacy norms, or
may be unable to pay for the increasingly monetized privilege
of privacy, leading to worse outcomes [9, 18, 19]. Empirically,
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we know that variation in SES, along with differences in skills
and advice sources that may be partially correlated with SES,
are associated with differences in users’ security and privacy
beliefs and behaviors [10,13,23–25,27,31,34]. No prior work,
however, has examined how users’ SES, advice sources, and
resources relate to each other and to the security and privacy
experiences that users report.
To better understand this intersection of demographics, infor-
mation, and experiences—particularly with respect to low-
SES users—we analyzed data from a probabilistic, census-
representative, telephone survey of 3,000 U.S. respondents,
which we received through a data grant from Data&Society.
The survey over-sampled from the low-SES population. The
thoroughly pretested survey queried respondents’ security and
privacy experiences, including becoming the victim of a scam,
having your identity stolen, having an email or social media
account compromised, losing a job or other opportunity as a
result of something posted online, and having someone post
something about you online without consent; other questions
examined respondents’ advice sources, available internet re-
sources, and demographics. The relationships identified in our
analysis, and the prevalence of the experiences reported by
respondents, are accurate within 2.7% of their true values in
the entire U.S. population.
In line with prior work, we find that less educated users have
different sources of security advice than more educated users.
Contrary to prior assumptions, however, we find that low-
education users report equal or lower prevalence of negative
security and privacy incidents as compared to higher-education
users, that there is no relationship between prevalence of re-
ported incidents and income, and that users’ reported experi-
ences are related to their advice sources, regardless of their
SES or resources. These findings have important implications
for how we develop, distribute, and evaluate security and pri-
vacy advice, as well as how we think about the digital divide
from a security and privacy perspective.
METHODOLOGY
To examine the relationship between SES, advice sources,
resources, and self-reported security and privacy incidents, we
modeled the results of a 3,000-respondent telephone survey
using binary logistic regression. Our Institutional Review
Board (IRB) determined that our analysis of existing data did
not constitute human subjects research. Below, we discuss the
dataset and survey development process, sampling procedure,
details of our statistical analysis, and limitations of our work.
Dataset
The dataset was collected by Princeton Survey Research
Associates International (PSRAI) for Data&Society via a
computer-assisted-telephone-interview (CATI), random digit
dial (RDD) census-representative survey of 3,000 respondents
from November 18 to December 23, 2015. We received this
dataset through a Data Grant from Data&Society (funded by
the Digital Trust Foundation). 1
The survey was developed by a senior researcher at
Data&Society with the intent of releasing the data for analysis
regarding the impact of SES on security and privacy. She
assembled the survey both by authoring and pre-testing new
items and by leveraging a number of pre-tested questions from
surveys conducted by Pew and Reason-Rupe [3, 5–7]. The
survey asks questions regarding respondents’ security and pri-
vacy experiences including their advice sources, their prior
negative experiences, and the resources available to them, as
well as standard demographic questions. The order in which
the questions were asked was randomized to prevent order
bias [21]. Additionally, demographic questions were placed at
the end of the questionnaire to minimize sensitivity and bias,
as per expert recommendations and best practices [29].
Prior to deployment, the questionnaire was pretested with a
small number of respondents. These interviews were moni-
tored by PSRAI and conducted by experienced interviewers
to ensure that respondents understood the questions.
The survey was administered via CATI by professionally
trained interviewers in both English and Spanish. Calls were
made throughout the day, on multiple days to both landline
and cell phones to maximize the chance of connecting with
different respondents. Every person in the United States had a
non-zero chance of being selected for the survey. 2 This was a
probabilistic survey, the dataset was weighted to be represen-
tative of the U.S. population, and the findings we report are
accurate within 2.7% of the true prevalence in the population.
A full outline of the survey items, weighting methodology, and
analysis code can be found at go.umd.edu/2124.
Analysis
We built two sets of binary logistic regression models in our
analysis, using the survey R library to incorporate the survey
weights [22]. The first set of models was used to predict the
odds of an individual reporting having experienced a security
or privacy incident: one model included respondents’ advice
sources, another included SES status, and the third combined
both. The second set of models predicted the likelihood that
respondents with different SES used particular advice sources.
We chose a simple grouped model rather than five individual
models for ease of interpretability.
To reduce the chance of overfitting our data, we deliberately
chose parsimonious models with input factors based on prior
work [26]. To further prevent over fitting, we performed 5-fold
cross validation in line with commonly used classification and
1The survey development and deployment portion of this study was
approved by Chesapeake IRB [4].
2Those who did not have a telephone were contacted via mail and, if
interested, were provided with a phone to use for the survey.
regression practices [15]. We calculated the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC) [8] across five folds for each model, and
we found that the AIC values for each fold were within an
average of 3% of each other. For each model, we present the
outcome variable, including factors, log-adjusted regression
coefficients (odds ratios), 95% confidence intervals (moder-
ated by the survey design effect [20]), and p-values.
Limitations
Self-reported surveys have several common limitations, chiefly
related to under- and over-reporting, which may be caused
by satisficing (selecting the first satisfactory answer without
thinking deeply) [17], recall bias (misremembering experi-
ences), desirability bias (selecting a socially desirable rather
than honest answer), and the potential for questions to be mis-
interpreted. These were mitigated by using thorough question-
development and pre-testing processes and by interviewers
reminding respondents to answer thoroughly and honestly.
The survey was brief, minimizing respondent fatigue.
This survey measures only whether respondents have ever
used certain advice sources or had certain negative experi-
ences. As a result, we cannot determine how often a particular
advice source was consulted or how many negative experi-
ences a respondent had; nor can we determine whether an
advice source was consulted before or after any negative event.
Thus, we report our findings together with several hypothetical
explanations and suggest that future work should investigate
these relationships further. In addition, we did not conduct
a controlled experiment, and thus these results should not be
interpreted as implying causality.
RESULTS
Below, we describe the survey sample and the factors that
relate to users’ security and privacy experiences.
Sample
Our unweighted sample was nearly representative of the U.S.
population with respect to gender, age, education, geographic
region, number of adults in the household, population density,
household phone usage, and race/ethnicity. The weighted
sample is fully representative of the population, such that the
95% confidence interval for this survey is 2.7 points. This
confidence interval is calculated based on the survey design
effect, which represents the loss in statistical efficiency that
results from a disproportionate sample design and systematic
non-response. Table 1 compares a subset of the demographics
of our weighted and unweighted sample to the 2013 American
Community Survey [2]. Further, the prevalence of negative
experiences in our data is in line with prior work. 3
Security and Privacy Incidents
All internet-using respondents were asked questions regard-
ing negative security and privacy incidents that they had ex-
perienced, such as “Have you ever had important personal
information stolen, such as your Social Security Number, your
credit card, or bank account information?" We find that 49%
of all respondents in the weighted data reported at least one of
3See go.umd.edu/2124 for a comparison with Pew 2013 data [1].
Metric Unweighted Weighted Census
Male 52.4% 48.7% 48.2%
Female 47.6% 51.3% 51.8%
Caucasian 58.1% 62.8% 65.8%
Hispanic 18.6% 15.6% 15%
African American 14.0% 11.8% 11.5%
Other 6.7% 7.4% 7.6%
LT H.S. 12.8% 12.6% 13.3%
H.S. grad 27.4% 27.8% 28.0%
Some college 24.0% 30.0% 31.0%
B.S. or above 34.6% 28.7% 27.7%
18-29 years 16.3% 20.1% 20.9%
30-49 years 24.6% 32.6% 34.7%
50-64 years 28.8% 25.4% 26.0%
65+ years 27.0% 18.6% 18.4%
<$20k 20% NA 32%
$20k-$40k 21% NA 19%
$40k-$75k 18% NA 18%
$75k-$100k 10% NA 11%
$100k-$150k 8% NA 12%
$150k+ 7% NA 8%
Table 1. Sample demographics, percentages may not add to 100% due
to non-response. Income was the unweighted variable of interest.
Data: educationToOutcome • Chart ID: SankeyID1bb70ca0a82 • googleVis-0.6.1









Figure 1. Prevalence of those who reported a negative experience by
education level. Interactive diagram: jsfiddle.net/5orqbkp4/3/.
the negative experiences shown in Figure 1. To determine how
these reported incidents relate to respondents’ SES, advice
sources, and resources, we utilized binary logistic regression
models to predict a participant’s likelihood of reporting one or
more of these experiences. We created three models, detailed
below. The results of all three models are presented in Table 2.
First, to understand how SES related to respondents’ reported
security and privacy incidents, we modeled these incidents as
a function only of SES factors. In this model, we find that edu-
cation is the only factor significantly related to a respondent’s
likelihood of reporting a negative experience (income was not
correlated). Surprisingly, we find that those with lower levels
of education—less than a high school diploma, and less than
a bachelor’s—are 60% and 35% less likely, respectively, to
report at least one of the five negative experiences (Table 2).
While 53% of those in the weighted dataset who hold a bach-
elor’s or above reported a negative experience, only 47% of
those who had less than a bachelor’s reported such an incident.
Model Factor OR CI p-value
SES <H.S. 0.40 [0.2, 0.81] 0.01*
& Resources Only H.S. to B.S. 0.65 [0.44, 0.97] 0.03*
<$20K 1.09 [0.69, 1.74] 0.71
$20-$40K 1.20 [0.79, 1.84] 0.39
R: Cell only 0.74 [0.52, 1.06] 0.11
R: Home internet 1.94 [0.87, 4.32] 0.1
Advice A: Friend 1.85 [1.25, 2.73] < 0.01*
Only A: Website 1.92 [1.15, 3.21] 0.01*
A: Coworker 1.59 [0.98, 2.58] 0.06
A: Gov. Website 1.59 [0.87, 2.88] 0.13
A: Librarian 1.73 [0.75, 4.02] 0.2
A: Teacher 0.95 [0.45, 2.01] 0.9
Advice A: Friend 1.84 [1.24, 2.72] < 0.01*
& SES A: Website 1.76 [1.06, 2.94] 0.03*
A: Coworker 1.53 [0.95, 2.46] 0.08
A: Gov. Website 1.52 [0.85, 2.74] 0.16
A: Librarian 1.88 [0.82, 4.31] 0.14
A: Teacher 0.92 [0.44, 1.96] 0.83
<$20K 1.09 [0.68, 1.76] 0.72
$20-$40K 1.19 [0.77, 1.83] 0.44
<H.S. 0.53 [0.25, 1.09] 0.09
H.S. to B.S. 0.75 [0.5, 1.13] 0.17
R: Mostly cell 0.77 [0.53, 1.12] 0.17
R: Home internet 1.73 [0.77, 3.88] 0.18
Table 2. Regression results for three different models of reporting at
least one negative experience (binary). ‘A’ and ‘R’ indicated boolean ad-
vice sources and resources, respectively. “Mostly cell” indicates primary
internet access via mobile, and “Home internet" means internet at home.
Baseline for the categorical household income factor is >$40K; baseline
for education is a bachelor’s or above. OR is the odds ratio between the
given factor and the baseline; CI is the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 1 illustrates that negative experiences were unevenly
distributed across educational groups; 32% of those holding a
bachelor’s or above reported having information stolen, com-
pared to 20% of those with less than a bachelor’s. There are
several potential explanations for this finding, which should be
explored in future work: less-educated users may be targeted
less frequently for scams or identity theft, they may have more
difficulty recognizing or recalling negative events, or they may
have protective skills or resources not measured in this survey.
Prior work suggests that advice sources are related to users’ se-
curity behaviors, and therefore potentially to their security ex-
periences [24–26]. Thus, our second model evaluates whether
the likelihood of reporting at least one negative incident is sig-
nificantly related to advice sources. We find that respondents
who take advice from friends and websites are 85% and 92%
more likely to report at least one negative experience, respec-
tively. Of those who took advice from friends, 49% reported a
negative experience, compared to 25% of those who took ad-
vice from a co-worker, 21% from a non-governmental website,
14% from a government website, and 8% from a teacher or
librarian. This may indicate that respondents more often seek
advice from certain sources after a negative experience, that
librarians and teachers give particularly good advice, or that
respondents are receiving detrimental or difficult to interpret
advice from friends, coworkers, and websites. .
Finally, we wanted to understand whether advice and SES
were both related to the security and privacy incidents that
users report, or whether if we controlled for both variables,
only one would remain significant. We therefore constructed
Factor OR CI p-value
<H.S. 0.01 [0, 0.06] < 0.01*
H.S. to B.S. 0.49 [0.31, 0.79] < 0.01*
<$20K 0.86 [0.42, 1.73] 0.66
$20-$40K 0.66 [0.36, 1.22] 0.19
R: Cell only 0.69 [0.4, 1.18] 0.17
R: Home Internet 1.62 [0.5, 5.24] 0.42
Table 3. Regression results for website advice source model. Tables for
all advice sources: go.umd.edu/2124.
a third model containing both advice and SES as explana-
tory factors. We find that only advice sources are significant
factors. Using a likelihood ratio test [30], we find that this com-
bined model has a goodness of fit significantly better than the
SES-only model (X2=45.09, p < 0.001, d f = 1164) and not
significantly different from the advice-only model (X2=7.33
p = 0.29, d f = 1164). This suggests that users’ negative
experiences relate to their advice sources, regardless of SES.
Advice, SES, and Resources
While we find that privacy and security incidents are related to
respondents’ advice sources, rather than their SES, we were
curious to determine whether our prior finding—that there is
an SES gap in advice sources [25]—held true in our sample.
To do so, we constructed logistic regression models with users’
advice sources as outcome variables and SES factors as inputs.
Our results show that users’ advice sources are related to
their level of education; Figure 2 provides an overview of
respondents’ reported advice sources organized by education.
We find that users who hold less than a high school diploma
are 99% less likely to report a coworker as an advice source,
and those who hold less than a bachelor’s degree, but who
completed high school, are 51% less likely (Table 3). Similarly,
those who held a high school diploma were 50% less likely to
report coworkers and those with under a high school education
were 73% less likely to report using government websites.
Perhaps surprisingly, there was no significant difference in the
SES or resources of respondents who reported taking advice
from librarians, friends, and teachers. Overall, these results
confirm our prior findings.
We hypothesize that these findings relate to less-educated users
having different job roles, possessing relatively fewer internet
skills [14], and distrusting websites that provide general advice
without a clear source [26]. We also hypothesize that advice
from websites may be more difficult to read and interpret than
advice from other sources. Of note, there was no relation-
ship between available internet resources and advice sources,
implying that accessibility of advice related to devices and
internet access may not be a problem.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we used logistic regression to investigate how
users’ advice sources, SES, and resources relate to the security
and privacy experiences they report. Our findings, accurate
within 2.7% of the true prevalence in the U.S. population, sug-
gest first that advice is significantly correlated with security
and privacy incidents; second, that reported incidents are not
directly tied to SES but to a divide in where users of differing
Table 1
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Figure 2. Respondents’ advice sources by education (weighted).
educational attainment seek advice; and third, that less edu-
cated users report equal or fewer security and privacy incidents
as more educated users. Below, we place our results in context
and provide suggestions for future work.
Advice Matters
Our findings show a clear relationship between respondents’
security and privacy experiences and advice sources. The
direction of this relationship is unclear: do people receive bad
advice that leads to worse experiences, or do they wait to seek
advice until after a negative experience? We hypothesize some
of both. In either case, however, this finding confirms that
the current advice ecosystem is not working, and should be
reevaluated. Future work should revisit what makes bad advice
bad—outdated or incorrect content, poor presentation, a lack
of readability, belief in the talisman of useless advice [16], or
some combination—and look for ways to remove it or replace
it with better advice. We should also evaluate the utility of new
channels, such as public service announcements, for helping
users find good advice.
Redefining the Digital Divide
Researchers have previously identified differences in skills,
resources, and advice sources between lower- and higher-SES
users. Our findings challenge the assumption that these dif-
ferences lead to worse security and privacy outcomes for low-
SES users. In particular, we find that income and available
resources, such as in-home internet, have no impact on re-
ported incidents. In line with prior work [25], we find that
less educated users rely on less traditionally authoritative ad-
vice sources, such as friends and family. Unexpectedly, this
difference is correlated with reporting slightly fewer negative
incidents; further study is required to understand the causes of
this result. There may be valuable lessons to learn from how
less-educated users transmit security and privacy skills.
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